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Abstract: The Trade Related Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) has had a 
profound effect on industrialization and innovation, as well as access to med-
icines in cases of public health crisis such as HIV/AIDS. However, compliance 
with TRIPS has varied in developing countries, despite heightened international 
pressure. For instance, Brazil has pursued a coherent approach to its HIV/AIDS 
health crisis, while India has failed to take care of its HIV patients despite late 
compliance with the TRIPS agreement and the presence of business firms that 
produce the generic medicines for HIV/AIDS. This article suggests that divergence 
in TRIPS compliance is the result of a linkage politics, in which global variables 
(global rules, global supply chains and global networks) reach into the domestic 
political economy to alter the interests and capabilities of domestic actors. Indian 
pharmaceutical firms have developed external and export interests that lower 
incentives for the Indian state to design a nationally relevant public health policy, 
while the Brazilian health movement with its societal and external linkages puts 
pressure on the Brazilian state to defend the interests of its HIV patients even at 
the cost of patents. We conclude by suggesting that linkage politics is better at 
helping us understand compliance with international agreements than existing 
explanations, with important consequences for the effectiveness of international 
institutions.
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1  Introduction
A state’s response to a public health crisis like HIV/AIDS reflects a nation’s desire 
to care for its citizens. Global agreements such as the one regarding intellectual 
property (Trade Related Intellectual Property Agreement, hereafter TRIPS) seek 
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to safeguard patents for private sector corporations, but also limit a state’s ability 
to encourage indigenous production and ensure low cost medicines in cases of 
public health crises, such as HIV/AIDS. Tied in this trade-off, then, is a fight over 
intellectual property rights, with implications for the private sector’s innovation 
profile and its capacity to supply medicines to its citizens. These trade-offs mean 
that global regulations create crucial dilemmas for many developing countries – 
especially large, self-reliant countries such as India and Brazil. In doing so, they 
undermine the boundary of national autonomy that states hope to exercise in pro-
tecting the health of their citizens. As countries began implementing the global 
TRIPS agreement in the 1990s and 2000s, different actors – states, private business 
interests, and civil society – struggled with the trade-offs unleashed by changing 
markets and international rules, which created new dilemmas for state autonomy 
and business strategies alike. In response, global regulations and the reach of MNCs 
to set prices across the globe, prompted a global civil society campaign for access 
of drugs to poor patients. This fight over “access to medicines,” then, “brings out 
the interplay of national and international dimensions and, in particular, the great 
challenges the national health systems of poorer countries confront on account of 
an international environment they can do very little to influence.”1
Brazil and India, two emerging powers with similar state capacity, dealt with 
these emerging challenges differently. Brazil pursued an autonomous domestic 
approach to its health crisis, despite a compliant patent regime that made it more 
difficult to invoke such a national program. This program combined tough negoti-
ations with MNCs with public provision of HIV medicines and an aggressive treat-
ment program. India, recognized to be the “pharmacy to the developing world,” 
incorporated key flexibilities in its legal framework but failed in designing a 
strong and coherent management of its HIV crisis despite having both domes-
tic and international conditions that would have made such a response feasible 
and possible. Prevention was over treatment. India did not ensure that its own 
pharmaceutical producers, who were the primary providers of such medicines 
all over the world, provide cheap medicines to its patients. While India could 
not use compulsory licenses for the first line HIV/AIDS drugs as they were not 
patented in India, it could have used other measures to ensure cheaper and better 
treatment options for its citizens. In India, only 20% of HIV/AIDS patients receive 
anti-retroviral drugs, while in Brazil it is close to 60%.2
Why does Brazil have a more aggressive and comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy 
despite having a strong history of compliance with global rules that makes it more 
1 Shadlen (2009); Pogge, Rimmer, and Rubenstein (2010).
2 The Indian data is from India’s National AIDS Control organization. Also cited in Eimer and 
Lütz (2010). The Brazil data is from the World Development Indicators 2012.
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difficult to design an autonomous domestic program? Why does India have a less 
comprehensive HIV/AIDS policy despite having fewer restraints in terms of inter-
national compliance, a flexible domestic law that provides autonomy to local 
industry and a private sector that supplies low-cost HIV drugs to the rest of the 
world? India’s behavior is especially puzzling as it points towards unexpected 
convergence with international norms while Brazil seems to challenge and exhibit 
greater national autonomy vis-à-vis its international obligations. What explains 
how strong states such as India and Brazil deal with the trade-offs created by 
an onerous global patent regime such as TRIPS and the need to address domes-
tic needs such as the HIV/AIDS health crisis? We need further research into why 
states’ responses to this crisis vary, with a particular focus on the differing capac-
ity to deploy the flexibility provisions available within the TRIPS agreement.3
Recent scholarship on this topic examines the relationship between domestic 
strategy and international commitments by outlining the dilemmas that interna-
tional commitment creates for states. We extend this extensive literature by focus-
ing on the issue of how and why some states try to maintain domestic autonomy 
within the larger boundary of compliance. We propose a theory of linkage politics 
that suggests that global or systemic variables such as global rules, global supply 
chains and global networks reach into the domestic political economy – even in 
strong and self-regarding powers – to change the fundamental interests, and the 
capabilities, of domestic actors.4 In doing so, we propose a modification of the 
conventional wisdom that locates the sources of divergent autonomy to domestic 
level variables, while pressures for convergence are seen to arise only from the 
global levels. In contrast, we suggest that global level linkages (markets, rules, or 
networks) can provide the resources and incentives for domestic level autonomy 
and divergence as well as convergence. We argue that the divergence literature 
in comparative politics has mostly focused on domestic interests and institu-
tions while neglecting the international linkages of domestic actors that shape 
the quantity, sustainability, and character of variable domestic responses. The 
international relations literature on convergence sees the global level as provid-
ing pressures and constraints rather than creating new winners that support glo-
balization, as we argue here.
In our argument, then, countries’ domestic policies vary not only because 
domestic actors have autonomy from global factors. Unexpected responses by 
both Brazil (stronger than one would expect given its early compliance with TRIPS) 
and India (weaker than one would expect given its advanced pharmaceutical 
3 Sherrll, Somerville, and Bailey (1992); Boone and Batsell (2001); Lieberman (2005).
4 This resonates with the international organizations literature’s interest in studying the effect 
of global rules of the game.
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industry and late and flexible compliance) can be explained by assessing how 
new domestic actors are activated or mobilized differently through their interac-
tions with international actors, organizations, and networks. For Brazil, global 
societal linkages with its strong social movement for the right to health played 
a crucial role, while the emerging exporting and global material interests of the 
Indian pharmaceutical industry contributed to higher prices, and a defense of 
patents rather than patients. The internal and external linkages differentiate 
these new actors – including business actors and NGOs alike. Global factors 
and linkages create new domestic level actors and new capabilities, with widely 
varying capacity to respond to international pressure.
Employing a strategy of “paired comparison” or “nested comparison”5 we 
offer some alternative mechanisms in our cross-regional comparison of India and 
Brazil.6 This article focuses on the linkages across levels (global and domestic 
linkages) and between state and society (intra-country linkages). The next section 
lays out the comparative puzzle in greater detail. Section 3 presents our theory of 
linkage politics, which focuses on how issues, ideas, people, and interests are 
linked across national and international arenas and their effect on state’s respon-
siveness to HIV/AIDS. Sections 4 and 5 detail the case study analysis of India and 
Brazil. We conclude with a discussion of how this analysis can be extended to 
other cases of interest, South Africa and Thailand, thereby expanding the scope 
of our argument.
2   The puzzle: variation in the trade-off between 
patents, profits, and patients
Historically, India has resisted global pressures to comply with international 
agreements. India illustrated the ability to extract autonomy even in the face of 
global pressure by implementing the TRIPS agreement relatively late (2005) while 
countries like Brazil and China accepted the agreement in the mid 1990s. As a 
result, India did not begin issuing patents for pharmaceutical products until 2007 
although it instituted a TRIPS consistent domestic law in 2005. Simultaneously, 
its national industrial policy created a uniquely indigenous capability to produce 
generic versions of the AIDS cocktail drugs. Given these historical dimensions of 
state desire and national capacity, India’s response to its fast growing HIV/AIDS 
crisis should have been stronger and more effective. Yet, here emerges a puzzle: 
5 Lieberman (2005); Tarrow (2010).
6 See Lieberman (2009); Shalden (2009); Eimer and Lutz (2010).
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India’s response to the HIV/AIDS crisis has been slow and indifferent even though 
its domestic law incorporated some important provisions favoring its citizens. 
Why has India adopted a relatively ineffective approach to HIV/AIDS policies 
despite its high capacity to produce generic medicines and lack of constraints, 
namely the absence of patents on key antiretroviral medicines?
In contrast, Brazil complied with the TRIPS agreement early (1996) and began 
issuing patents at that time. Indeed, Brazil went beyond TRIPS requirements 
and also offered patents retroactively (so-called pipeline patents). At that time 
(1996), Brazil also lacked a diversified indigenous pharmaceutical sector with the 
ability to produce basic drugs. Yet, Brazil implemented a strong, well-designed 
strategy of both global importation of HIV/AIDS drugs and a domestic policy that 
ensures universal access to citizens affected by this disease. Why does Brazil have 
a more aggressive and comprehensive HIV policy despite having signi ficantly less 
health-friendly patent policy?
This puzzle is illustrated in Figure 1, which maps out the policy changes in 
Brazil and India from an early period (t1: early 1990s) when both countries were 
faced with pressures to comply with the TRIPS agreement to a later period (t2: 
mid 2000s). The figure represents the trade-off between industry needs (patents) 
and domestic citizens’ needs (patients). More specifically, the y-axis represents 
the spectrum of compliance. Brazil, for example, complied early (1996) with the 
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Figure 1 Expected (gray) and observed (black) policy trade-offs between state autonomy and 
TRIPS compliance.
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TRIPS agreement (see “Brazil (t1)”) while India had low compliance in t1 and only 
complied with TRIPS in t2 (2005) with a number of flexibilities in its domestic 
regime. The x-axis represents the spectrum of state autonomy.
Figure 1 illustrates that the expected policy response (in gray) is not the 
observed policy response (in black). International level explanations would 
predict that India – given its early resistance to the intellectual property rights 
regime – would have a higher level of state autonomy and would be in Cell 2. Com-
parative politics explanations would suggest India should be in Cell 3. Instead, 
we observe India’s move from Cell 3 to Cell 1 between 1995 and 2005. In other 
words, India did not extract and expand its state autonomy while complying with 
TRIPS. Given Brazil’s early adoption of TRIPS, we would expect Brazil – given 
its low capacity and high restraints in terms of early patents on pharmaceutical 
products – to maintain its position in Cell 1. Instead, we observe a move from Cell 
1 to Cell 3 – from low state autonomy to high state autonomy, while still main-
taining high compliance. This combined puzzle demands an answer. Why does 
India not seek autonomy, despite having the capacity to do so? How does Brazil 
successfully seek autonomy, even though it has substantial barriers in doing so?
At first glance domestic differences seem to accurately predict this variation 
in national responses.7 Gauri and Lieberman argue that a country’s ethnic politics 
and what they call boundary institutions affect the state’s ability to deal with 
HIV/AIDS. Eimer and Lutz argue that India’s state implementation capacity is 
considerably weaker than Brazil’s.8 Yet, these plausible conclusions render some 
elements of Brazil and India’s engagement with TRIPS and the HIV/AIDS crisis 
puzzling. First, both countries are keen to signal to the outside world their accep-
tance of the global intellectual property rights regime. The global strategies of the 
two rising powers have changed toward greater interdependence and compliance 
in the last two decades; this development cannot be fully explained by a pure 
divergence-type argument. Second, the apparent differences in their responses 
to the HIV/AIDS crisis – the use of bargaining strategies vis-à-vis pharmaceutical 
companies and a more effective AIDS treatment strategy in Brazil compared to 
India – cannot be explained by domestic-level explanations alone. Pure domestic 
explanations are not wrong in explaining policy responses. What we are propos-
ing is a more nuanced explanation that suggests that intra-state (domestic) and 
across state (external) linkages activate strong domestic responses even when 
domestic boundary institutions may suggest otherwise. And, India’s weaker 
capacity outlined in Eimer and Lutz (2010) is due to the specific linkage mecha-
nisms outlined here that render its state unable to bargain effectively with the 
7 See Gauri and Lieberman (2006). Also see, Lieberman (2009).
8 Eimer and Lutz (2010).
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producers of these medicines. Theoretically, the conventional understanding of 
divergence renders the domestic and international realms separable from each 
other, at a time when greater interdependence, diffusion, and linkage across 
levels are evident.
We argue, instead, that variation in domestic responses is driven by the 
 different ways in which the two country’s pharmaceutical sectors and social 
movements are integrated at the domestic and global level. Despite similar com-
pliance to TRIPS and similar state capacity in the two countries, Brazil’s exter-
nal and domestic linkages allow the state to resist global pressures, while India’s 
pharmaceutical industry’s external linkages, and weak intra-state linkages of 
social movements narrows the arena of autonomy for the Indian state. Simply 
put, the argument we make here is parallel to the argument made by Peter Evans 
in his classic monograph, Dependent Development (1997), in which he showed 
how international capital created domestic alliances and interests. Evans focused 
largely on industry interests; we also bring in the global networks of social move-
ment actors who pressured Brazilian officials to design a national program in 
favor of both HIV patients as well as a domestic pharmaceutical industry. We find 
that domestic capital and domestic social movements are no longer an internal 
force whose interests are only tied to the national economy and domestic policy. 
Instead, domestic actors and organizations now operate globally, and share with 
global capital and global social movements an interest in global markets and 
global connections. This is not to deny some differentiation of domestic and mul-
tinational capital but to suggest that conflicts of interests are subtler and impor-
tantly, linkages and networks across the domestic and global arenas drive the 
extent and nature of “national autonomy.” The strength of domestic networks 
is still important, but domestic strength is also affected by the degree of global 
linkages.
How does our argument modify the conventional wisdom on international 
and domestic interactions? Frieden and Rogowski argue that international eco-
nomic changes – especially the easing of international exchange – have affected 
domestic politics in virtually every country.9 Yet, most scholars have found little 
support for the initial claims regarding the power of global forces to undermine 
national autonomy. Garrett argues that market integration co-exists with inter-
ventionist governments and greater policy divergence.10 Wade suggests that gov-
ernments continue to retain national autonomy even in the face of increased 
interdependence.11 David Vogel, in another variant of this argument, notes that in 
9 Frieden and Rogowski (1996: p. 25).
10 Garrett (1998).
11 Wade (1996).
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the field of environmental policy, global pressures facilitate an enhancement of 
environmental standards, or “trading up.”12 We find that these debates are overly 
dichotomous: states either follow the dictates of globalization or they use their 
national autonomy to resist globalization. These binary categori zations offer no 
way of analyzing those situations where states strategically use their national 
autonomy to implement globalization – as is the case in large, power ful states such 
as India and Brazil. Clearly, we must go beyond discussions of divergence vs. con-
vergence or compliance vs. resistance. In contrast, we focus on the mechanisms 
that transform and then sustain domestic responses, and the types of linkages 
both within a nation-state and in its external, global linkages. This complexity 
is better captured by “relative divergence” or divergence within a larger frame of 
compliance and interdependence.
The conventional wisdom holds that the international level is the source of 
constraint and compliance pressures, while the sources of divergence are traced 
to the power of domestic political institutions to “block or refract the effects 
of internationalization.”13 Most analysts, when confronted with simultaneous 
cross-national variation and globalization, conclude that national policies and 
institutions create sources of variation and resistance to internationally rooted 
pressures and constraints. This article modifies the conventional wisdom that 
locates the sources of divergent autonomy to domestic level variables, while pres-
sures for convergence are seen to arise only from the global levels. We argue that 
globalization itself has created new actors and new linked interests in domestic 
contexts that drive pro-globalization responses across even strong autonomous 
powers (India’s pharmaceutical sector, for example). We, therefore, urge the need 
to examine the international linkages and interests of domestic actors that shape 
the quantity, sustainability, and character of variable domestic responses. Com-
pliance with global rules and the implementation of globalization is being led 
by specific domestic actors and interests with increasing linkages and ties to the 
global realm.
3  A theory of linkage politics
Our theory of linkage politics compels us to explore the ways in which global 
and domestic arenas are linked to each other and the transformation of actors 
interests, preferences, and even identities that may result from these linkages. 
Two analytical questions are intrinsic to a theory of linkage. First, what is linkage 
12 Vogel (1997).
13 Keohane and Milner (1996: p. 5).
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politics? Second, what do linkages do? That is, what effects do linkages have on 
actors across levels (domestic or international) and how do they balance their pri-
orities? In order to build a theory of linkage politics that is capable of explaining 
both common actions of interdependence and compliance as well as variation in 
national responses, we draw upon the international relations debates on linkage 
politics. We also go beyond those debates to build new concepts.
The current understanding of linkage in international relations relies on the 
notion of externalities and trade-offs: when states act in two different – national 
and international – arenas simultaneously and their position in one arena affects 
their actions in the second.14 Bargaining game theory is used to analyze this 
basic idea of two-level or nested games.15 For Putnam, domestic incentives must 
be made consistent with a state’s international behavior; that is, the domestic 
level drives the linkage Putnam (1988). Yet, as Eichengreen and Frieden argue, 
the linkage argument fails to address the problem of credibility, that is, the gov-
ernments across the negotiating table must have some reliable sense that their 
actions will be sustained and not be backtracked.16 We build upon this insight 
and suggest that the literature on two-level games lacks a crucial link, as illus-
trated by its inability to provide a theory of how credibility is to be sustained 
when actors have interests tied to separable arenas and domains. Instead, we 
suggest that linkage theory must be able to explain how changing incentives and 
interests make actions across different levels consistent and credible. The current 
theory of two-level games lacks a clear understanding of the mechanisms that 
drives the transformation of interests and actions in a credible way.
We, thus, propose a theory of different types of mechanisms that enable 
actors and states located in different arenas to act in credible ways and to ensure 
sustained action. Sustained, credible action is only possible when interests and 
preferences in domestic arenas are transformed in the process of interacting 
across levels (Interest Linkage); when issues in one domain are linked with issues 
in other domains (Issue Linkage); and when the circulation of people, funds, and 
ideas (or information) follows the potential linkage of interests and issues (Car-
riers Linkage).17
Global interdependence creates new interests and new winners in domestic 
contexts. Specifically, export and technological links of the Indian pharmaceutical 
14 Rosenau (1969); Keohane and Nye (1977); Tsebelis (1990).
15 Lohmann (1997).
16 Eichengreen and Frieden (1993).
17 The third mechanism – carrier linkage – is similar to the notion of networks outlined in Keck 
and Sikkink (1998). We posit that the notion of linkage is superior to the notion of networks, 
which connotes only horizontal relationships while linkages can encompass both horizontal and 
vertical (across global and national) interactions.
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industry makes this sector unreceptive to providing cheap treatment options 
within India. Analogously, the international public health movement framed 
issues in terms of the “human right to healthcare and treatment” as well as the 
universal right to affordable medicines, providing a different framing to local 
domestic social movements, which then, link with the local state and the phar-
maceutical industry to extract autonomy against the global pressures in favor 
of a restrictive intellectual regime (Interest Linkage). Simultaneously, the issue 
framing in domestic contexts (Issue Linkage) as well as the domestic state-social 
movement linkages in terms of funds and people are very crucial to undergird a 
state’s political will or capacity (Carrier Linkage).
While state action towards HIV patients is our dependent variable, unilateral 
notions of state power prove insufficient to explain the variation across our cases. 
Each of these three mechanisms – transformation of interests, issues linkage, 
and circulation of linking carriers (people, funds, and information/ideas) – are 
 necessary to understand the variation in national responses to global rules. Thus, 
we define linkage politics not merely as the existence of nested games as in the 
exiting literature but the processes and mechanisms through which the nested 
character of different arenas (domestic-global and state- societal) is embodied 
and transformed. Linkage politics is the missing mechanism that transforms the 
existence of trade-offs and externalities within and across levels into influence 
and sustained action.
Linkage is a difficult variable to measure as it connotes relationships and 
interactions. We assess linkage in terms of three mechanisms: Interest Linkage; 
Issue Linkage; and Carrier Linkage or the extent of the flow of people, funds, 
and information across levels. First, interest linkage refers to the incentives that 
actors have to invest in certain action, for example, the incentives to produce 
medicines for the domestic vs. export markets. We measure interest linkages by: 
export of domestically produced generic drugs; the sales of medicines in regu-
lated markets (US and Western Europe) as well as other external alliances; and 
the state’s support of, or involvement in the generic sector.
Issue linkages are strong when issues or the way the issue is framed origi-
nates in, and is linked with, the political discourse in third countries or at the 
international level. This relationship is observed, for example, when access to 
medicines is framed as an issue of human rights domestically, which resonates 
with the international discourse; or the extent of government-civil society ties 
on HIV/AIDS related issues, including the government’s participation in sector-
initiated domestic activities, such as conferences.
Both issue and interest linkage must transcend boundaries requiring carriers 
and modes of transmission (carrier linkage). The volume and intensity of circu-
lation of people, funds, and ideas allows us to measure the extent of carriers’ 
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linkage. In concrete terms this can be measured by: the participation (and timing 
of participation) in international conferences; regular interactions and circula-
tion of people across levels and arenas, sharing of information and resources, 
as well as strategic discussions between groups belonging to different levels 
(national/global and state/local); the presence of international philanthropic 
funding both by international organizations, and private donors. These factors, 
together, create carrier linkages, defined as the circulation of key actors, funds, 
and ideas across arenas.
The variation in linkage politics relies upon two variables: the strength of the 
domestic social movement sector and the strength of the domestic pharmaceuti-
cal industry. We measure these in terms of the strength of NGO networks; the 
breadth of their approach to HIV/AIDS; and the level of fragmentation among 
these groups. For attributes specific to the strength of the domestic pharmaceuti-
cal industry, we assess the size of domestic market share and the presence and 
strength of indigenous production.
In the following section, we discuss the logic of our paired case comparison 
and also outline how we measure the independent and dependent variables of 
interest. The remainder of the paper assesses the variation in the form and nature 
of linkage between national and international levels as well as between state and 
societal actors to understand the dynamics of TRIPS and responses to HIV/AIDS 
in India and Brazil. We conclude by discussing the generalizability of our theory 
and provide illustrative extensions to Thailand and South Africa.
4  Case selection and measurement
Methodologically, a cross-regional comparison – Brazil and India – goes against 
the grain of the usual cross-national but within-region studies in comparative poli-
tics.18 The two countries are similar in terms of area (although not the size of popula-
tion), aggregate GDP, and the share of exports in the GDP, which leads us to expect 
that they will, generally speaking, respond to global “pressures” in similar ways. As 
emerging economies, India and Brazil have more in common with one another than 
they do with their regional neighbors. We argue that such cross-regional studies 
can be useful in addressing comparatively driven questions as well as analyzing 
issues of globalization, the effects of which go beyond regional groupings.
In the 1980s, the severity of the HIV/AIDS crisis was equally grave in India 
and Brazil. Table 1 summarizes the basic contours of the HIV/AIDS crisis across 
18 For other important cross-regional studies see Kohli (2004).
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our cases. The first AIDS case in Brazil was reported in 1982. Only 8 years later, in 
1990, there were 10,000 new cases. At that time, the epidemic in Brazil was often 
compared to that in South Africa. The “World Bank estimated that Brazil would 
experience 1,200,000 HIV infections by the year 2000, explicitly expressing the 
fear that the epidemic would then be totally out of control.”20 Instead, the epi-
demic’s growth rate had decreased by 1996; by 2004 it was believed that half of 
the projected 1.2 million HIV cases were averted.21 Today, the Brazilian Ministry of 
Health estimates that fewer than 200,000 people have HIV/AIDS.
India is home to one of the world’s largest populations living with HIV/AIDS 
after South Africa, the worst affected nation in the world, and Nigeria. The first 
case was detected in 1986 and since then HIV/AIDS has rapidly spread through-
out India. India’s infection rate is nearly twice that of Brazil and India is home to 
2.5 to 3.8 million reported HIV cases, the highest in South Asia and, again, third, 
after South Africa and Nigeria.22 Given India’s population and its youthful charac-
ter, the HIV/AIDS crisis, if unchecked, could have serious domestic consequences 
and gravely affect the global effort to curb the epidemic.
Table 1 AIDS crisis across cases.
Brazil India
Total population, in millions (2010) 194.9 1170.9
GDP, in billions (Constant USD) (2010) 916.1 963.4
GDP growth, annual% (2010) 7.49 8.81
Prevalence rates (2009)19 0.6 0.3
People living with AIDS 314,218* 2,400,000
Deaths due to AIDS 2000–25,000 170,000
Source: World Development Indicators (2009/2010) and UNAIDS program (http://www.unaids.
org/en/regionscountries/countries/). The data on people living with AIDS is from the CIA 
WorldFactbook.
*The Brazil data for “People living with Aids” is from and CIA “Progress Report on the Brazilian 
Response to HIV/AIDS (2010–2011),” Department of STD, AIDS and Viral Hepatitis (DDAHV), of 
the Health Surveillance Secretariat (HSS), Ministry of Health (MoH), Brazil.
19 UNAIDS/WHO’s Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (2004) defines prevalence of HIV as the 
percentage of people ages 15–49 who are infected with HIV.
20 Levi and Vitória (2002).
21 Biehl (2004).
22 There is some controversy about the total number of HIV cases in India. In 2005 India was 
supposed to have around 5.6 million cases but a recent National Family Health Survey re-as-
sessed that figure to around 2.5 million (this survey was conducted between 2005 and 2006, 
published in 2007). Unreported cases are likely to be much higher than other countries as there 
is cultural illiteracy about AIDS and social taboos about seeking tests for AIDS.
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Compliance with TRIPS occurred early in Brazil (1996) in comparison with 
India (2005), and yet, Brazil has clearly exhibited state autonomy vis-à-vis the 
international system in the post-compliance phase. Although common percep-
tions suggest that Brazil’s utilization of the compulsory license in May 2007 and 
its threats to do so as early as 200123 were rebellious acts, Brazil has a long history 
of complying with international law surrounding intellectual property rights and 
pharmaceuticals. In contrast, India’s compliance record with international trea-
ties has been more contentious, which might suggest that India would use the 
flexibilities provided by the TRIPS agreement. India was an aggressive opponent 
to the TRIPS agreements during the Uruguay Round and remained a lone voice 
of resistance to its passage after others agreed to sign on. Despite external pres-
sure by the US, especially between 1995 and 1998, India did not comply, showing 
a rare ability to resist external “pressures” and only complied in 2005 after 
loosing at the WTO dispute-settlement court in 1997–1998; by doing so, it took full 
advantage of the transition period allowed under TRIPS. Moreover, the Indian 
amendment to the patent law in 2005 exploited most of the flexibilities available 
under the TRIPS agreement; its legal framework allows compulsory licenses and 
pharmaceutical exports to other developing countries without restrictions.24 The 
Indian implementation of the TRIPS agreement has been recognized to institute 
important autonomy for the state.25
Our dependent variable is the government response to the HIV/AIDS crisis, 
which has two dimensions that illustrate states’ dilemmas (see Table 2). First, 
we measure international actions, which include compulsory license usage and 
bargaining with private MNCs to reduce prices of medicines. India could not 
use the compulsory license provision, as many of the HIV drugs were not under 
patent within India. Yet, Indian state officials were well positioned to negotiate 
with national firms to provide drugs at lower cost or issue compulsory licenses for 
second line treatment on which patents are still valid.26 We analyzed the prices 
of AIDS drugs available in the Indian market and found that they were higher 
than prices the same Indian firms were charging in Africa (Table 3). Second, we 
measure the domestic management of the HIV crisis and the state’s commitment 
to addressing the health crisis by assessing whether the government response 
included HAART (highly active antiretroviral therapy), the timing of treat-
ment options, and the government’s matching funds (if any) with international 
23 Cohen (2006).
24 Gupta (2008).
25 Article 3(d) for example.
26 The second line therapy is needed when patients become resistant to the early treatment 
drugs, which is very common.
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Table 2 Dependent variable: government response towards HIV/AIDS.
India Brazil
Government response Failure Success
Price negotiations with MNCs and Indian firms No Yes
Utilization of compulsory license No* Yes
(May 2007)
HAART (Highly active antiretroviral therapy) as part of initial response** No Yes
Timing of antiretroviral therapy as part of a national program Late Early
(April 2004) (1989)
*India could not have used CL for drugs, which were not patented in India as India started 
 implementing patents late. So, India’s use of CL only applies to second line and patented drugs.
**Biomedical research has shown that treatment is extremely effective in stalling the progress 
of the disease and even in preventing new infections, as HIV/AIDS patients do not infect others 
while they are under treatment. The medical community has moved strongly in favor of highly 
active treatment therapy as controlling and preventing the disease in the future.
funding. International and domestic state actions, in our view, influence the 
severity of the crisis, which is measured in terms of the percentage of those with 
HIV/AIDS receiving ARV (antiretroviral) treatment and the reduction of HIV infec-
tion rates over time.
5  Brazil: a surprising case of strong action
The Brazilian state’s response to the HIV/AIDS crisis has been strong, effective, 
and coherent. Since 1996, the government has reduced AIDS mortality rates by 
half and reduced hospitalization for HIV/AIDS by 80%.27 As a result, Brazil gained 
widespread international recognition for its work, including the UNESCO award 
for Human Rights and Culture of Peace in 2001; the UN AIDS Program award for 
their “leadership in improving the fight against the epidemic;” and the Gates 
Award for Global Health in 2003.28 In addition, the World Health Organization 
asked the head of Brazil’s National AIDS Program to help create an international 
policy to combat the disease.29
How did such a strong national response come about? In May 1985, as the 
military dictatorship was beginning the abertura (opening) of the political system, 
27 St. Petersburg Times, 8 January 2006.
28 Ministry of Health of Brazil 2005.
29 Chicago Tribune, 8 June 2003.
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well-organized activists pushed the state to adopt an inclusive healthcare model, 
based on principles of citizen solidarity.30 In 1988, responding to civic commit-
ment on this issue, the Ministry of Health established guidelines for the creation 
of the National AIDS Control Program (NACP) of Brazil31 and in unprecedented 
fashion, included health services as a constitutional right.32 The 1988 Constitu-
tion stipulates that all Brazilians have access to basic medicine and universal 
healthcare. This commitment – an important issue linkage (both domestically 
and, as explained below, internationally) – is the foundation upon which Brazil’s 
 successful prevention and treatment approach has achieved great gains. Civic and 
state actors had strong issue linkages throughout this period as democratic rights 
were linked to citizens’ health rights and the state’s obligation to ensure access to 
health services. In fact, the effort to transform “access to AIDS treatments from 
being an individual right into a collective right required additional legislation and 
state-based allies [for civic actors].”33 Such linkages were important in encourag-
ing the Brazilian government to guarantee free and universal access to HAART 
(antiretroviral treatment) for all citizens – a policy that was passed in 1996.
Issue linkages helped the government balance its international obligations 
and its responsibility to uphold the constitutional right to provide universal health-
care. One mechanism for doing so was to utilize protections consistent with TRIPS 
and the Doha declaration to articulate a strong commitment to domestic health-
care. For example, in 2001, the US challenged the legality of Brazil’s domestic law 
in the WTO’s dispute-settlement court. Brazil’s patent law, Article 68, stipulates 
that compulsory licenses can be issued in situations in which the patent holder 
does not locally manufacture the product (known as the “local working” require-
ment). Responding to the US challenge of the law, the Brazilian state, with the 
help of domestic and international NGOs, launched a sophisticated international 
public relations campaign and, among other things, ran multiple advertisements 
in The New York Times that emphasized the normative principles of the universal 
right to healthcare.34 In the context of this legal challenge, the government utilized 
30 Petchesky (2003).
31 Galvão (2000).
32 Berkman et al. (2005: p. 1162).
33 Flynn (2013: p. 8). Issue linkages were very strong, in part, because individuals that were 
part of a health reform movement, the sanitaristas, also became key figures in state health de-
partments during the transition to democracy. It was these individuals, Flynn argues, who were 
“key protagonists in confronting patent monopolies and foreign pressure regarding Brazil’s IP 
policies” (Flynn 2013: p. 9).
34 In June of 2001 an advertisement in the New York Times was signed by the government’s STD/
AIDS program, the Brazilian Ministry of Health, the Brazilian National Network of People Living 
with HIV/AIDS, São Paulo State AIDS NGO Forum, and other Latin American AIDS NGO networks.
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the existing issue and carrier linkages between domestic and international advo-
cates to form powerful, strategic alliances with key INGOs, such as Oxfam and 
Medecins Sans Frontieres to fight the US-initiated legal challenge.35 Brazil’s issue 
linkage and carrier linkages originated with domestic social movement actors con-
necting to international activists. We argue that this link, combined with strong 
state capacity and an indigenous (though weak) pharmaceutical sector, explains 
the strong resistant behavior adopted by the Brazilian state.
5.1  Indigenous pharmaceutical business capacity
Unlike India, Brazil’s domestic pharmaceutical industry focused primarily on 
the domestic consumer market and had few global linkages (see Table 4). Thus, 
it was a ready handmaiden to the national state’s desire to fashion a strong 
response to the AIDS crisis. As such, it was able to generate generic competi-
tion, as well as the credible threat of local ARV production, which allowed Brazil 
to bargain effectively with the foreign MNCs for price reductions.36 Despite this 
indigenous capability, we argue that what was significant about Brazilian local 
pharmaceutical capability was that the Brazilian-owned industry developed to 
be a partner of – rather than a partner with – the Brazilian state, another impor-
Table 4 Comparative extensions of linkage politics and relative divergence.
India Brazil
Government response Failure Success
Issue linkages Weak Strong
 Framing of HIV/AIDS issue as human rights No Yes
 Civil society – government ties Weak Strong
Interest linkages Strong Weak
 Level of domestically-produced generic drugs High Low
 Majority of sales in regulated markets Yes No
 State’s support of, or involvement in, generic sector Uninvolved Involved, main partner
Carrier linkages Weak Strong
 Participation in international conferences No Yes
  Regular interactions and circulation of people 
across levels and arenas
No Yes
 Level of international funding for HIV/AIDS issue Low High
35 Galvão (2002).
36 See discussion of the government-owned research laboratory and factory, Far-Manguinhos, 
in Petchesky (2003).
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tant interest linkage. First, the Brazilian pharmaceutical market share is small, 
and, more importantly, is predominately foreign-owned. Second, faced with an 
accelerating AIDS crisis, the Brazilian state took the initial steps in developing 
domestic local manufacturing capacity as well as importing medicines from 
Indian companies. The generic industry grew to meet domestic demand and 
maintained a strong focus on its patients. Unlike the Indian case, the Brazilian 
generic industry has not grown to be a powerful export sector of the Brazilian 
economy. Instead, its interests and incentives remained tied to national con-
cerns, largely defined by the state.
The Brazilian state has worked to improve the development of domesti-
cally produced generic drugs. The Generic Drug Law, passed in 1999, took 
8 years for approval and reduced the price for generic drugs considerably (by 
25–30%).37 In fact, a fundamental strategy for the Brazilian treatment program 
is the domestic production of some of the HIV/AIDS drugs. This domesti-
cally oriented interest linkage is further strengthened as “Brazil encourages 
new entrants in the generic market by offering preferential purchase options 
in public tenders and special financial investment conditions through state 
finance organizations.”38 By 1999, 47% of anti-retrovirals were acquired from 
domestic firms, of which 92.5% were from state-run laboratories, and 7.5% from 
private companies; by 2001 – just 2 years later – this share increased to 63% 
by domestic firms.39 While India exports the majority of its generic drugs, the 
Brazilian public health care system purchases nearly all generic production as 
part of the government’s HIV/AIDS program.40 Thus, the state consciously cul-
tivated intimate intra-state issue and interest linkages with the state-run labo-
ratories and medical professionals.41 These linkages also ensure that domestic 
state-expert carrier linkages are effectively harnessed toward addressing 
the larger HIV crisis by lowering the costs of local generic drug production 
and acquisition of antiretroviral drugs, often from Indian manufacturers, for 
Brazilian citizens.
37 Minister Serra has also promised to provide incentives for manufactures of generic drugs; 
Bruce (2003). This is especially interesting give that, at the time, Minister Serra was the candidate 
for president in 2002 from the incumbent party, PSDB (The Brazilian Social Democratic Party).
38 Galvão (2000).
39 Galvão (2002); Cohen and Lybecker (2005).
40 Cohen (2000).
41 Some note that the state’s involvement has been to the detriment of local, private production 
of generic drugs – specifically ARVs – as the government crowds out their participation. See 
Flynn 2011.
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5.2  Brazilian social movements
Linkage politics in Brazil began with a well-organized, domestic-led NGO sector 
that reached out to International NGOs. The state followed suit with a strong 
response through legislation, media campaigns, and support for innovative HIV/
AIDS treatment and education programs. The transition to democracy created 
an active, dense, and diverse set of civic organizations that worked on HIV/AIDS 
issues prior to federal and/or international involvement, thereby establishing 
solid domestically based carrier linkages. As early as 1983, a group of gay activists 
called Other Thing (Outra Coisa) began distributing pamphlets about HIV/AIDS 
and HIV prevention in São Paulo. As the disease initially affected white, upper-
middle class gay men, many of whom were heavily involved in the civic activ-
ism against the dictatorship, the issue of HIV/AIDS could not be sidelined and, 
instead, was “pushed to the forefront of the national consciousness.”42 A group 
of middle-class educated, urban women, who originally offered support to those 
infected with leprosy, began offering their services to HIV/AIDS patients as early 
as 1984 and just a few years later, the Catholic Church and other religious organi-
zations also became involved.43 Activists formed the first AIDS-specific organiza-
tion, AIDS Support and Prevention Group (GAPA, Grupo de Apoio à Prevenção à 
AIDS) in São Paulo in 1985 and the Brazilian Interdisciplinary Association of AIDS 
(ABIA, Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS) in Rio de Janeiro in 1986. 
GAPA and ABIA established numerous satellite organizations throughout the 
country, all of which increased awareness of HIV/AIDS and criticized the govern-
ment for not addressing the epidemic. Initially, all organizations were comprised 
of volunteers, as no government or international funding was available at the 
early-to-mid 1980s. Brazilian HIV/AIDS NGOs held national meetings which, in 
1989, comprised of 30 people from 14 organizations and grew to include nearly 90 
different organizations as early as 1992.44
Given the strength and heterogeneity of domestic NGO activity, it is no surprise 
that leaders from these organizations took the initiative to become involved in, and 
solidify carrier linkages with international NGOs. ABIA and GAPA, among others, 
participated in the International Conference on AIDS held in Montreal in 1989. 
There, Brazilian HIV/AIDS activists worked to create an international network of 
organizations working with AIDS, called the International Council of AIDS Services 
Organizations (ICASO). In fact, Brazilian NGO activists were the first to receive inter-
national funding from the Ford Foundation in 1989 due to connections they had 
42 Toronto Star, 5 August 2006.
43 Galvão (2000: pp. 57–59, 73–74).
44 Galvão (2000: pp. 60, 62, 89–92).
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made with academics and activists working in the US. The diversity of the groups 
working on HIV/AIDS, in combination with their ties to the international commu-
nity – especially during a time of increased political openness – made the Brazilian 
state take notice.45 Civic organizations used this political opening to solidify citizens’ 
right to healthcare (Article 196 in the 1988 Constitution), access to basic medicines,46 
and worked to apply this provision for HIV/AIDS patients: federal law 9313. This 
law, passed in 1996, mandated the free and universal provision of HAART through 
the public health system. In addition, government officials established a HAART 
Support Committee, which is completely independent of the Ministry of Health.47
Importantly, the national government began to work closely with Brazilian 
NGOs consolidating essential issue and carrier linkages within Brazil. In 1992, the 
Ministry of Health participated in the organization of the fifth National Meeting of 
AIDS NGOs. With support from domestic NGOs, Brazilian politicians approached 
the World Bank in the 1990s, at a time when the World Bank had yet to estab-
lish an explicit HIV/AIDS strategy. The World Bank noted that the Brazilian gov-
ernment’s “commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS preceded Bank involvement, and 
general prevention programs almost certainly would have occurred even without 
the [World Bank] projects.”48 By 1994, with funding from the World Bank, the gov-
ernment financed many of the same organizations that also participated in the 
National AIDS Commission, a government advisory committee.49 Clearly, there 
were regular overlaps and circulation of key people between the governmental 
and civil society organizations.
With a weak, domestically owned pharmaceutical sector and a relatively 
strong state, Brazilian activists were able to put HIV/AIDS on the agenda. Due 
to strong issue (human and democratic rights and health rights were linked to 
each other) and carrier linkages, activists kept HIV/AIDS on the agenda. Civic 
activists continued to partner with the state while still holding the state account-
able for its earlier promises. Many argue that, “[a] principal reason behind the 
Brazilian government’s strong commitment to the HIV/AIDS program, particu-
larly with regards to the free and widespread distribution of antiretroviral, is the 
effective, well-organized lobbying from civil society.”50 A notably strong domestic 
45 For a description of the sanitarista movement, to which many of these groups belonged, see 
Flynn (2008).
46 Article 196 states that “health is a right of all and a duty of the state,” guaranteeing universal 
and equal access to health services, provided for free by the government.
47 Levi and Vitória (2002).
48 Beyrer et al. (2005: p. 42).
49 Osava (2008).
50 See Galvão (2002: p. 1862); Flynn (2011: p. 153); Petchesky (2003: p. 95) notes that former 
activists became strong advocates for reform within the government itself.
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and international community of HIV/AIDS activists played a key role in Brazil-
ian state’s response to this epidemic. When the Brazilian state decided to negoti-
ate lower prices and eventually issued a compulsory license, there were already 
significant issue and carrier linkages that provided domestic support for such 
efforts. In sum, we argue that Brazil’s strong state, weak pharmaceutical sector, 
and the presence of linkage politics between domestic social movements and 
international activists has allowed Brazil to actively follow their HIV/AIDS policy, 
even while complying at the international level.
6  India: the dog that did not bark51
In contrast to Brazil, the Indian state’s response has been slow, fragmented, 
and ineffective. This is especially puzzling given India’s state capacity in other 
domains, and the presence of a pharmaceutical industry able to produce generic 
medicines for HIV/AIDS. Though the government launched a national program 
in 1987 and followed this with the establishment of the National AIDS Control 
Organization (NACO) in 1992, the rate of people being treated with HAART 
remains very low.52 Only 6 to 15% of patients have access to the regular dosage 
of antiretroviral drugs53 and availability of the cocktail drugs is very limited. 
A report in The Hindu states that “[c]ompared to the universal programme of 
Brazil, the government of India’s attitude can only be described as criminal.”54 
Joanne Csete, Director of the HIV/AIDS program at Human Rights Watch noted: 
“It is a sad irony that India is one of the biggest producers of the drugs that 
have transformed the lives of people with AIDS in wealthy countries. But, for 
millions of Indians, access to these medicines is a distant dream.”55 The Indian 
experience reveals that a state’s ability to produce medicines and its willingness 
and ability to provide reasonable and cheap access to HIV/AIDS medicines to 
patients need not go together.56
51 This idea comes from the short story, “Silver Glaze” featuring Sherlock Holmes, where Holmes 
noted the “curious incident that the dog that did not bark at night.”
52 World Health Organization 2007. A World Bank loan for AIDS prevention led to the estab-
lishment of NACO, as the World Bank loan required a national coordinated response. See Dube 
(1992).
53 The Hindu, 23 February 2001: p. 19. This is in stark contrast to Brazil, where it is estimated 
that 80% of those in need of ARVs can access them, a notably high rate of coverage worldwide. 
UNAIDS 2008.
54 The Hindu, 23 February 2001: p. 19.
55 Human Rights News 2002.
56 We thank an independent reviewer for this formulation.
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In 2001, Cipla, an Indian-based pharmaceutical company, made a dramatic 
offer to sell a three-drug cocktail at $350 a year for one person to Medecins Sans 
Frontieres for free distribution in its HIV/AIDS programs in Africa (and at $600 to 
 governments in Africa). In India, the same cocktail is priced from $1100 to $2000 
a year (according to Cipla).57 Paradoxically, Cipla proposed prices for Viraday, its 
latest version of the HIV/AIDS cocktail, were twice as high in India as in Africa.58 
The owner of Cipla, however, blames the Indian government. In the 1990s, Cipla 
was asked by the Indian Council on Medical Research to create a generic version 
of Glaxo Wellcome’s AZT, the first HIV/AIDS medicine. While Cipla sank resources 
into successfully replicating the drug, the Indian government announced it would 
spend its money on prevention, not treatment.59
India’s incorporation of treatment as part of its domestic strategy was delayed 
and ineffective. In December 2003, the government requested public sector hos-
pitals in six out of 28 states to provide treatment60 and in April 2004 India began 
distributing free ARV drugs to about 100,000 poor HIV/AIDS patients. Only in 
2007 did the Indian government declare HIV/AIDS a national emergency and even 
then, a coherent state-led program of ensuring access to affordable drugs and 
prevention programs was lacking.61 India did not have a treatment strategy until 
very recently. The Indian state also has shown no desire to deploy the exceptions 
provided in the TRIPS agreement on behalf of its citizens. While India could not 
use the compulsory license provision in the same way given its internal capacity 
to produce drugs, the Indian state never negotiated with its pharmaceutical firms 
to lower prices, as did Brazil and Thailand.62
What is striking is that the same pharmaceutical firms sell the HIV/AIDS 
cocktail drugs within India at higher prices than they sell in Africa and even 
57 Dr. Kumaasamy of the YRG center for AIDS Research and Education claims that it cost a pa-
tient around $1500–2000 a year, see The Hindu, 23 February 2001: p. 19.
58 The Financial Times, 30 March 2008: p. 1–2.
59 The Financial Times, 30 March 2008: p. 1–2.
60 World Health Organization 2007.
61 After severe criticism, the Indian government did initiate some key policy changes. In 2007, 
the government reported using $2 billion to fight the disease, provided free antiretroviral treat to 
75,000 people, and set up 3500 free testing centers. See, The New York Times, 8 June 2007.
62 In March 2008 India’s patent controller issued the country’s first compulsory license to 
NATCO for Bayer’s Nexavar, a medicine for kidney cancer but a compulsory license for the sec-
ond line AIDS drugs may be more urgent. Similarly, the Gleevec case is relevant. Novartis filed 
a case in 2007 requesting a patent for its new medicine and has appealed to the Supreme Court 
of India to uphold the patent of its new drug for cancer. In April 2013, the Supreme Court ruled 
against Novartis, stating the patent could not be provided because the drug is too similar to the 
earlier version. See New York Times, 4 April 2013. While the Indian judicial system is acting in 
favor of Indian patients, the state has not used these debates to provide better treatment options 
for HIV/AIDS, a disease that affects a much larger number of patients in India.
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Brazil. Table 3 shows this discrepancy, wherein each drug is sold at higher prices 
in India despite the easy availability of that drug by Indian firms. Around 800 
million people in India live on less than $2 dollars a day and would surely benefit 
from having a lower price. Thus, Indian patients do not benefit from India’s late 
entry into TRIPS nor by the productive capacity of the firms to produce those 
drugs cheaply. Clearly, India continues to lack a comprehensive strategy and 
institutional response to the HIV/AIDS crisis while Brazil’s commitment has 
been strong since the early 1990s.
Could India’s poor health infrastructure especially in the government 
sector be responsible for such negative outcomes for HIV/AIDS? India’s health 
model is one of private and nongovernmental provision for health,63 with its 
attendant negative effects for any public health crisis such as lack of insur-
ance, lack of comprehensive health management and a focus on family plan-
ning. Moreover, the continued presence of such common diseases such as 
gastroenteritis, tuberculosis, and malaria preoccupies the health infrastruc-
ture. Could the weakness of its health structure have been responsible for 
India’s weak response to HIV/AIDS? Weak health capacity certainly played 
a part in India’s inability to scale up treatment options. In countries such as 
Thailand and Brazil, the government used its public health system to provide 
cheap treatment options. Even so, Brazil’s health infrastructure was also very 
weak before the HIV/AIDS crisis.
In 1995 Brazil spent 6.6% of its GDP on health while India spent 4.2%, which 
is not a significant difference. However, by 2010, Brazil expenditure had increased 
to 9% and India’s had declined to 4%.64 It is this expansion in health expenditure 
that reveals the story of variation across India and Brazil rather than the initial 
health base. In Thailand and Brazil, for example, the urgency of the HIV/AIDS 
crisis led the government to build and strengthen its health system. Dr. Mauro 
 Schechter, Chief of HIV/AIDS research at the Federal University in Rio notes 
“Brazil’s success is remarkable because it was built atop a shaky health system 
that was not fully set up to deliver complex treatment.” In his view Brazil inte-
grated treatment and prevention in a way that was not seen as a model before.65 
In India, this did not happen. Thus, while India’s weak health system may have 
been an obstacle to creating a coherent HIV/AIDS treatment model, the HIV/AIDS 
crisis could have served as a stimulant to its strengthening if other linkage such 
as a locally oriented pharmaceutical industry or a well-linked domestic social 
movement existed in India. In Brazil, HIV/AIDS activists demanded reform and 
63 Berman (1998).
64 Data are from World Development Indicators 2012. Calculated by authors.
65 Toronto Star, 5 August 2006.
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renewal of the health infrastructure and the state responded with an expansion 
and improvement of its health infrastructure.66 The state has failed its HIV/AIDS 
patients in India, despite not in spite of, its health infrastructure.
6.1  Indigenous pharmaceutical business capacity
India’s pharmaceutical sector is uniquely capable of addressing India’s need for 
affordable medicines for the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Yet, with changing global rules 
and shifting interest linkages of the industry, its preferences moved away from 
responding to the domestic crisis and became oriented toward export markets 
and global supply chains both in terms of production and innovation. This global 
integration of domestic firms contributed to an indifferent domestic response in 
favor of cheap prices for HIV/AIDS drugs despite the possibility and the capac-
ity for an aggressive pro-treatment strategy at home. Equally as important, issue 
linkages with the state on behalf of HIV/AIDS patients were lacking, which con-
tributed to an incoherent response toward the HIV/AIDS crisis (see Table 4).
India’s pharmaceutical sector enjoys domestic strength and global preemi-
nence. The domestic firms control 77% of the domestic market.67 It is one of the 
few industries able to produce the HIV/AIDS cocktail medicines cheaply and in 
such high quantity so as to provide them to African, Asian, and Latin American 
countries.68 Paradoxically, its strong global interest linkages – exporting power 
as the supplier of generic medicines to the rest of the world – transformed the 
pharmaceutical sector’s preferences in favor of stronger patent protection and 
requirements to secure export markets in regulated and unregulated markets. Its 
exports increased from $47.9 million to $3177.3 million in 2003–2004; and exports 
have grown at the rate of 20.8% since 1995–1996.69 Moreover, stronger compe-
tition with multinational corporations in India and in export markets after the 
onset of patents, and a restrictive regulatory regime in India put greater pressure 
on margins and profits, increasing the incentive to capture new export markets.
66 While health policy scholars are critical of the progress Brazil has made in terms of its infra-
structure and capacity to provide healthcare to HIV/AIDS patients, relative improvements have 
been made. Such improvements are also impressive when compared with India. See, for exam-
ple, a broad discussion of the changes made in Brazil’s public health system, in response to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Berkman (2005). For a more critical perspective on the improvements that 
still need to be made, see Gómez (2011); Elias and Cohn (2003).
67 Chaudhuri (2005).
68 The World Health Organization 2007 lists four companies able to produce HIV/AIDS therapy and 
three of the firms are from India: Cipla; Hetero Drugs Limited; Ranbaxy; and Matrix Laboratories.
69 Chaudhuri (2005).
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The US, with the toughest regulatory requirements, emerged as the largest export 
destination for Indian firms. In fact, the US market now accounts for sizeable rev-
enues for Indian companies: 32% in the case of Dr. Reddy’s and 42% for Ranbaxy.70 
After 2001, markets with extremely high HIV/AIDS infections – namely, Africa – also 
became significant. Indian firms began to target generic markets in the US and EU, 
both in terms of exports, manufacturing, as well as acquisitions, FDA approvals, 
and patent protection in regulated markets. Indian pharmaceutical firms also began 
marketing and manufacturing in these markets, which led them to comply with the 
TRIPS within their own operations. Ranbaxy, for example, has 32 subsidiaries in 19 
countries; Dr. Reddy’s has 14 in 9 countries; and Sun Pharma has 4 subsidiaries. 
Many of these companies also manufacture outside of India. By now, exports, regula-
tory issues in developed markets, and the need to secure new markets dominate the 
market and political strategies – and interest linkages – of Indian firms. As such, their 
market strategies have catalyzed strategic alliances and linkages between domestic 
and foreign firms.71
Both private sector actors and some government officials became support-
ers of the patent system, creating new interests in favor of implementing TRIPS 
rather than using it to provide cheaper drugs domestically. Parvinder Singh, Ran-
baxy’s CEO, led a crusade in the 1990s to persuade the government and other 
industry actors to change their practices and accept the TRIPS regime.72 He noted: 
“[Ranbaxy] realized that you can not afford to isolate yourself if you want to glo-
balize. To sell in the international market, Indian companies have to play accord-
ing to the host country’s rules.”73 Similarly, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories learned to 
use the US patent system and play by globally consistent patent rules. In the early 
2000s, a split within Indian pharmaceutical ranks led to the creation of an asso-
ciation of 11 large research-based national companies, which began to support 
the patent regime.74 These changing interests and strategies make Indian phar-
maceuticals more supportive of the international system of patents, and moder-
ate in their nationalist stance regarding national interventions on behalf of crises 
such as HIV/AIDS, with the sole exception of Cipla’s Dr. Hameid.
70 Rangnekar (2006).
71 Ip-health Listerserv 1 May 2007.
72 Singh has stated this viewpoint elsewhere: “The government has to understand the urgency 
of liberalizing and freeing our industry from price and profit controls, which have continued to 
hurt the growth of our industry. In the light of the GATT decision, the industry must be freed so 
that those that are efficient are able to function effectively and thereby fund much larger outlays 
into research, because the key to survival will lie in this” The Telegraph 23 January 1994.
73 Business Standard 10 November 1993. This data is drawn from the author’s book project 
Aseema Sinha (Unpublished book Ms titled: When David Meets Goliath: How Global Trade and 
Rules are Changing India’s Rise to Power).
74 Cipla left this association in opposition against their stance on patents.
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Moreover, Indian pharmaceutical companies prefer to sell HIV/AIDS drugs 
in countries with strong state intervention on behalf of HIV/AIDS patients (such 
as Brazil or Thailand), where the government or a NGO procures medicines from 
exporting or domestic companies and then distributes them through the public 
health system. This ensures a secure market and a large market share, both are 
prerequisites for the low prices offered by Indian companies. In the absence of 
such state intervention for HIV/AIDS patients, Indian pharmaceutical majors 
have no interest in selling their products domestically. In India, the export and 
global interests of private firms are in line with the state’s lack of interest in 
addressing India’s HIV/AIDS crisis and weak state-private sector linkages. Thus, 
prices of HIV/AIDS cocktail are much higher in India, the country that produces 
them, than in Africa where government commitment as well as generic competi-
tion has ensured a domestic strategy for expansion of treatment as well as afford-
able pharmaceuticals (see Table 3).
6.2  Indian social movements
Strong global interest linkages of India’s private sector (in terms of production, 
markets, and technological innovation) were complemented by a weak and 
delayed issue linkage of the HIV/ADIS activists. Most crucially, the social move-
ment advocates HIV/AIDS were fragmented, and largely focused on prevention 
and education rather than treatment. Internal issue linkages between NGOs and 
state actors were clearly lacking; in fact, the interactions were often distant and 
even hostile.75 In contrast to Brazil, were very few Indian NGOs focused exclu-
sively on HIV/AIDS work or access to healthcare and treatment. Moreover, civil 
society activism on the AIDS crisis started quite late, around 2001–2004, when 
international aid and financing began to flow to local NGOs.76 By then, the fight 
for universal access of healthcare could not gain momentum. Indian AIDS activ-
75 There are important exceptions to this pattern within India, when state and NGO actors have 
come together (linkage politics) to design innovative strategies and programs to deal with the 
crisis. For instance, the Sonagachi program in the red light strict of Calcutta, West Bengal (East 
India) became successful when the project’s administration was transferred in 1999 from the 
government agency to a cooperative society that included government agencies, sex workers, 
and NGOs. See Nag (2005).
76 Lawyer’s Collective started its HIV/AIDS initiative in 2001; Stop HIV/AIDS initiative (SHAII) was 
set up in 2004. Naz Foundation, one of the early organizations to focus on HIV (starting 1994), has 
focused its attention on legal challenges. Hamsafar Trust started some projects in 1999 but most 
of its programs started in 2001 with funds from USAID. Almost all NGOs started more programs for 
education and prevention after 2001 when international aid and NGO help increased dramatically.
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ists focused on educating high-risk groups (sex workers and truckers) about cul-
tural aspects of the disease (social taboos including talking about using condoms 
and sex), rather than uniting all aspects into one common and universal issue: 
the human right to access basic medicine. Without framing the issue as a human 
right to health, public health campaigns, while extremely courageous and impor-
tant, lacked the ability to target the state for its failure to provide a basic right to 
its citizens.
In addition, activist groups failed to unify the diverse segments of the HIV/
AIDS population. Under Indian law section 377 of the Indian penal code, known 
as the anti-sodomy law, gay men can be arrested for “unnatural acts.” This act 
criminalizes same-sex behavior. This stark fact, of course, limited the possibility 
of organizing among the gay community and delayed activism. Gay activism, in 
fact, developed in part over the HIV/AIDS crisis, when the Naz Foundation was 
founded in 1994 as an HIV/AIDS outreach organization and went on onto to focus 
on all aspects of gay life and discrimination. HIV has created the opportunity for 
this sector of the population to organize and mobilize.77 Yet, given the extreme 
social and cultural taboos in India, most gay organizations focus on the social 
aspects of the disease and do not target the government or the private sector for 
improved access to treatment. Gay organizations realized that, “to fight AIDS, 
activists found they had to fight homophobia, including section 377.”78 Despite 
this activism, gay activists have not been well received. In 2004, activists were 
arrested for distributing health related work on AIDS.79 As a result, universal 
health care for the gay community has not yet become an important issue.
Interestingly, AIDS activism among other high-risk communities – sex 
workers and truckers (a key group with a high prevalence of the disease) – has 
been more successful and focused on education, information and breaking cul-
tural barriers, rather than on access to health care. In the Brazilian case, civil 
society’s focus on the state’s responsibility toward health care and universal 
access to drugs had the unintended effect of linking all actors behind a feasible 
and observable action, in the process achieving those goals. The Indian HIV/AIDS 
movement, with notable victories and campaigns, has failed to unite different 
kinds of issues, programs, and communities affected by HIV/AIDS. Despite their 
partial, though delayed, vibrancy, these diverse groups are unable to solidify the 
same issue and carrier linkages that would allow a unified campaign against the 
state or to mobilize the state to put pressure on the private companies to ensure 
77 Author’s interview with an activist from the Lawyer’s Collective, New Delhi, India, January 2007.
78 The Gully Online Magazine, 18 October 2004.
79 NPR, 25 August 2004.
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affordable access to drugs. Thus, in India, the indigenous social movement is 
fragmented, weak, and lacked crucial issue and carrier linkages with both the 
state and international organizations. Overall, India’s HIV/AIDS activism came 
late and lacked strong domestic and global interactions and alliances.
7   Conclusion: implications and comparative 
extensions
Our main theoretical contribution is in outlining a more nuanced theory of linkage 
politics to explain variation in national responses. In our view, scholars can no 
longer treat the international level as an exogenous variable that affects domes-
tic economies externally. We conceptualize of international effects not merely as 
“pressure” but in a more complex way, arguing for the need to look at the extent 
and nature of linkages, and new domestic interests activated by globalization. In 
doing so, we challenge the conventional view among both comparative politics 
and international relations scholarship, which suggests that domestic differences 
alone drive divergence in national responses to global developments. Scholars 
from both subfields suppose that domestic-level explanations provide room to 
maneuver while international markets and agreements are constraining. We argue 
the reverse: International linkages, under some circumstances, may increase the 
room for domestic actors to maneuver. This refinement, in turn, allows us to look 
at domestic and international variables not in isolation but explore the interac-
tions and relationships among them.
Using the theoretical model developed in this article, we analyze Thailand 
and South Africa’s responses to the HIV/AIDS crisis. In Thailand strong issue 
and carrier linkages played a crucial role in effectively addressing the HIV/AIDS 
crisis despite a relatively weak pharmaceutical sector.80 Shortly after 1984, when 
the first case of AIDS was documented, a national reporting system was imple-
mented.81 This surveillance program, combined with a proactive treatment and 
education program and the involvement of HIV/AIDS NGOs led to Thailand’s “sig-
nificant success in controlling the spread of HIV, with new infections falling from 
143,000 cases in 1991 to 23,000 in 2002.”82 Meanwhile, the Thai state established 
a symbiotic relationship with the private health care sector: doctors work in both 
public and private clinics and nearly all health professionals are trained at public 
80 Supakankunti et al. (2001).
81 Beck and Holland (2006: p. 353).
82 Beck and Holland (2006: p. 354).
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expense. This ensured strong domestic issue and carrier linkages. In congru-
ence with our argument, information flows and overlaps between different civil 
society actors (carrier linkage) created pressure on, and a strong incentive for, 
the Thai state to respond to the health crisis. In addition to strong intra-state ties 
between the state and the health care sector, Thai NGOs were in place to fulfill 
a leading role in advocating a strong response to the role of patent protection 
and HIV/AIDS.83 Like the Brazilian case, Thai NGOs also had strong ties to inter-
national organizations. Medecins Sans Frontieres began working in Thailand in 
1994, quite early, and by invitation from local NGOs (issue and carrier linkages). 
During this time, the government began to move away from using brand-name 
drugs and sought to strengthen the domestic generic sector and an expansion of 
treatment provision. In November 2006 and again in January 2007, the Thai gov-
ernment issued compulsory licenses for HIV drugs.84 Despite Merck’s offer to sell 
their drug at a “no-profit” price, the government could provide it at half the price 
by producing a generic version. Thus, Thailand’s policy response has been rela-
tively effective and timely, despite lacking – initially – a strong generic market. 
This can be explained by the strength of their strong issue and carrier linkages 
in the social movement sector and symbiotic domestic state-society interactions 
over public health issues.
South Africa has had surprising success in ensuring that treatment options 
could potentially become accessible for its population, but also failed to translate 
those potential gains into concrete outputs. This paradox can be explained by 
our theory of linkage politics. Today, South Africa is home to more people living 
with HIV than any other country, where one in five individuals are infected (17.8% 
or approximately 4.2 million people).85 In 1997, the Pharmaceutical Manufactures 
Association of South Africa (PMA), in collaboration with MNCs, challenged the 
1994 Medicines Amendment Act that sought to make treatment and access to 
medicines possible through the acceptance of the parallel importation and the 
issuing of compulsory licenses. In 1998 the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) placed South Africa on the Special 301 Watch List augmenting this chal-
lenge. This strong and concerted action was followed by an equally strong civil 
society action in the US as well as the enhancement of local-global ties within 
South Africa. Its strong issue and carrier linkage with the global movements 
aimed to ensure better treatment options for those with HIV. South Africa’s dense 
civil society and mobilization among unions, communist party, and churches led 
to a massive defeat for the MNCs as well as the USTR’s efforts to discipline South 
83 Ford et al. (2004: p. 561).
84 Cohen (2007).
85 Beck and Holland (2006: p. 246).
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Africa. In 1999, the multinational lobby (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America or PhRMA) announced the suspension of the lawsuit, amount-
ing to a remarkable victory for the fight against HIV/AIDS in South Africa. The 
strong international issue and carrier linkages did not translate to the domestic 
sphere, however. Indeed, the government and the local NGOs parted ways, and 
because of weak issue and carrier linkages, the government did not address the 
epidemic as they refused to provide access to ARVs in the public sector.86 Most 
concerning, however, was President Mbeki’s refusal to acknowledge first, the 
link between HIV and AIDS and second, the importance of ARV treatment. These 
developments pitted the domestic civil society against the state, and sundered 
any potential linkages between the state and society.87 This pronounced hostil-
ity between civil society and the state, the government’s refusal to implement 
an aggressive public sector-led treatment campaign, and the fragmented view 
within the South African state regarding treatment88 meant that significant legal 
victories were not followed by a reduction in infection rates.
Our model of linkage politics suggests that the social movement’s external 
linkages are counteracted by the state’s attempt to grow as a regional and global 
power (state’s external interest linkage) without alienating MNCs and the US. 
Most importantly, intra-state issue and carrier linkages are weak and hostile, 
thus prohibiting social activists from influencing state policy.  Though there has 
been widespread international awareness surrounding HIV/AIDS in South Africa, 
strong international-domestic issue and carrier linkages are not able to compen-
sate for the obstacles presented by the lack of state-society linkages and the 
state’s external interest linkages aimed at seeking international recognition from 
investors. The absence of these domestic state-society linkages are also under-
pinned by racially organized “boundary institutions,”89 which also prevented a 
coherent societal response.
Our findings confirm that globalization has not rendered the nation-state 
powerless. Yet, we argue that this variation across nations is not a confirmation 
of the pure divergence argument. We present a different, more nuanced, theoreti-
cal framework that emphasizes the need to theorize of convergent and divergent 
86 Klug (2008).
87 TAC initiated two separate cases against the South African government after 2001 by first, 
demanding that the government provide mothers and their newborns access to nevirapine, a 
crucial ARV drug and second, challenging the high prices of ARV drugs in South Africa. Again, 
TAC emerged victorious in legal and street campaigns empowered by its domestic activism and 
international networks.
88 There were two different views on treatment within the government: the former Deputy 
Health Minister supported it and Mbecki, South Africa’s President, denied it.
89 Gauri and Lieberman (2006).
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responses together, moving away from dichotomous conceptualizations. The 
notion developed here of “relative divergence” may better capture the deploy-
ment of compliance and global interaction for national purposes by many states. 
Future avenues of research should focus on this intersection and linkages in other 
cases and industries.
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